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INTRODUCTION
That controversial decisions by the United States Supreme Court can spur
dissenting citizens to action is, by now, a familiar idea. The primary recent
example remains the intense and sustained efforts to prohibit or substantially
restrict access to legal abortion spurred by Roe v. Wade,1 in which the Court
recognized a woman’s right to decide whether or not to continue her
pregnancy.2 Conversely, the Court’s failure to recognize a constitutional right
– for example, its controversial five-to-four Bowers v. Hardwick holding that
the constitutional right of privacy did not extend to private, consensual conduct
by homosexuals3 – may provoke citizens to seek social change and to turn to
other fora, such as state and federal legislatures or state courts.4
∗ Professor of Law and Paul M. Siskind Research Scholar, Boston University School of
Law. This Essay expands on my remarks delivered as a participant of the panel, “Beyond
Legislatures: Social Movements, Social Change, and the Possibilities of Demosprudence,”
at the symposium, “The Most Disparaged Branch: The Role of Congress in the 21st
Century,” held at Boston University School of Law, November 14-15, 2008. Thanks to
Lani Guinier for her catalytic work and to my other co-panelists, Fred Harris, Robert Post,
and Gerald Rosenberg, for their stimulating engagement with that work. This Essay
benefitted from that discussion. Thanks also to my research assistant, Jennifer Dixon, and
to Boston University Head of Reference Services at Pappas Law Library, Stefanie
Weigmann, for valuable research assistance.
1 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2 Id. at 153.
3 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003).
4 For a history of such post-Hardwick efforts, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR.,
DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY LAWS IN AMERICA, 1861-2003, at 250-52, 269-98
(2008).
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In a recent article, Professor Lani Guinier takes up an intriguing variation on
this idea, asserting that dissenting justices, both through written, but
particularly through oral, dissents, may spur “ordinary people” to action.5 In
stressing the role of dissents in expanding the range of democratic action,
Guinier is not merely reiterating the point that well-written dissenting opinions
serve important functions because they may provide the foundation for
majority opinions “twenty years from now,” or “broaden the jurisprudential
range . . . of the next generation of law students” by capturing their
imaginations.6 Rather, in stressing that “Justices teach by their opinions,”7 she
contends that “[i]n a contemporary context, . . . dissenting Justices may
educate, inspire, and mobilize citizens to serve the present as well as the future
goals of our democracy.”8 Guinier offers concrete examples in which oral
dissents apparently mobilized citizens and lent authority to their efforts at
social change and law reform:9 Justice Breyer’s oral dissent from the Court’s
holding striking down Seattle’s and Louisville’s voluntary school integration
plans in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No.
1,10 and Justice Ginsburg’s oral dissent from the Court’s narrow reading of the
statute of limitations for filing a sex discrimination claim under Title VII in
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.11 Observing that this tool is not the
sole province of one “side” of the Court, Guinier contends that a particularly
talented dissenter is Justice Scalia, who self-consciously uses both his oral and
written dissents as a means of “advocating for the future . . . for the next
generation and for law students.”12 Guinier (along with Gerald Torres, her coauthor elsewhere) coins the term “demosprudence” to refer to “lawmaking or
5 See Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court, 2007 Term – Foreword: Demosprudence
Through Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4, 12 (2008).
6 Id. at 14. Of course, judicial dissents may play this foundational role outside the
context of federal constitutional law as well. See, e.g., KIMBERLY D. RICHMAN, COURTING
CHANGE: QUEER PARENTS, JUDGES, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN FAMILY LAW
123-151 (2009) (arguing that dissents by state court judges in family law cases have played
a foreshadowing and catalytic role in instructing lawyers about how to craft future legal
challenges and in paving the way for later majority opinions recognizing the parental rights
of gay men and lesbians).
7 Guinier, supra note 5, at 14. In describing demosprudential dissenters “at their best,”
as “teachers in a vital national seminar,” Guiner draws on scholarship concerning the
educative role of Supreme Court opinions. Id. at 49 (quoting Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is
the Supreme Court an Educative Institution?, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 961, 962 (1992)).
8 Id.
9 Id. at 6-13, 35-45.
10 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2768 (2007).
11 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
12 Guinier, supra note 5, at 45 (quoting Posting of Dan Slater to WSJ Law Blog,
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/05/30/law-blog-chats-with-scalia-part-ii-master-of-thedissent/ (May 30, 2008, 21:04 EST)).

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1397114

2009]

EMPATHY AND SOCIAL CHANGE

591

legal practices that inform and are informed by the wisdom of the people.”13
Because dissents have “democracy-enhancing potential,”14 she urges the
Supreme Court to “see beyond academics to the people themselves as a source
of democratic authority and accountability.”15
In this Essay, I will offer three observations about Professor Guinier’s
intriguing project of encouraging the use of dissent to catalyze democratic
action. First, I examine the connection that Guinier sees between a dissenting
Justice’s life experience and his or her capacity to be moved by a litigant’s
plight.16 I look back to Lynne Henderson’s exploration, more than twenty
years ago, of empathy’s role in shaping Justices’ opinions.17 Second, I discuss
the emphasis on life experience and the capacity for empathy in President
Obama’s public statements about judicial qualifications, criticized by some for
stressing empathy to the detriment of justice and the rule of law.18 Third, I
contrast Guinier’s call for Supreme Court Justices to be more mindful of the
democratic potential of their dissents with political scientist Rogers Smith’s
proposal that judicial rulings, particularly those by the Supreme Court, can
further social transformation by “usefully highlight[ing] the way existing
arrangements appear to be working against constitutional goals and values,”
and identifying “the most important tasks of civic restructuring that confront
the rest of us.”19 Smith’s comparative modesty about the institutional capacity
of courts to bring about needed social transformation offers an instructive
contrast to Guinier’s aspirations for dissenters.20
I.

REVISITING THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY AND EMPATHY

What moves a Supreme Court Justice to issue an oral dissent? This question
spurs further questions, including one to which numerous academics, jurists,
and politicians have offered answers: what qualities are foundational for good

13 Id. at 15.
Guinier and Torres expound this idea of “demosprudence” in their
forthcoming book, LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, CHANGING THE WIND: THE
DEMOSPRUDENCE OF LAW AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (forthcoming 2010).
14 Guinier, supra note 5, at 15.
15 Id. at 131.
16 Id. at 32-45 (examining the biographies of Justices Thurgood Marshall, Stephen
Breyer, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg in relation to their most memorable dissents).
17 Lynne Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1576 (1987)
(arguing that “empathy enables the decisionmaker to have an appreciation of the human
meanings of a given legal situation”).
18 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Obama’s ‘Redistribution’ Constitution, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 28, 2008, at A17 (criticizing then-Senator Obama’s remarks about looking at a judge’s
empathy when deciding judicial appointments).
19 Rogers M. Smith, Gender at the Margins of Contemporary Constitutional Citizenship,
in GENDER EQUALITY: DIMENSIONS OF WOMEN’S EQUAL CITIZENSHIP (Linda C. McClain &
Joanna L. Grossman eds., forthcoming Oct. 2009) (manuscript at 5, on file with author).
20 Id. (manuscript at 4).
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judging?21 Professor Guinier proposes that something in the biography of
particular Justices leads them to identify with the losing litigant and with the
constituencies who will bear the impact of the majority’s opinion and to speak
directly to those people in their oral dissents.22 For example, Justice Breyer,
who issued an oral dissent in Parents Involved, “taught administrative law, and
his father was the lawyer for the Superintendents of Schools in San
Francisco.”23 She posits that his dissent is “speaking to school boards” and
that his “experience” connects him to those school board members whose
efforts were halted by the majority’s ruling.24 Guinier contends that Breyer
exhorts school board members to keep trying, telling them: “[D]o not feel
paralyzed by the majority because the law is on your side and the Court is
acting as a renegade.”25 Indeed, she argues that Pat Todd, a Louisville school
board member, took Justice Breyer’s exhortation “seriously,” persisting in her
endeavors by always reading his dissent at the beginning of her public
presentations around the county.26
Guinier argues that biography is also relevant to understanding Justice
Ginsburg’s impassioned oral dissent in Ledbetter, in which Ginsburg spoke
directly to working women whose pay discrimination claims would be barred
by the Court’s ruling (using the formulation “you”), and to Congress, urging it
to correct the Court’s ruling.27 Ginsburg’s role as a pioneer of the litigation
strategy that led to key equal protection rulings by the Court in the 1970s is a
relevant biographical fact that might have moved Ginsburg to speak to the
female workers suffering pay inequity.28 Guinier suggests that Ginsburg also
“found her own voice,” and had a “transformational moment” in issuing the
oral dissent, helping to convert Lilly Ledbetter’s loss into a “legislative
crusade” to change the law.29 This dissent expressed Ginsburg’s belief that
“legislative and political strategies for reform are more sustainable” than

21

See, e.g., Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for
Our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877, 1943 (1988) (arguing for a “revision of the conception
of the task of judging”).
22 See Guinier, supra note 5, at 32 (suggesting that Justice Thurgood Marshall’s “most
memorable dissents came in the areas in which he was most influential as an advocate”).
23 Id. at 37.
24 Id. (“That Justice Breyer is speaking to school boards, rather than directly to the
people . . . suggests a distinctive avenue for democratic engagement.”).
25 Id.
26 Id. at 38.
27 Id. at 39 (“Often relying on the personal pronoun, Justice Ginsburg spoke directly to
‘you’ – the women who had been paid less but had no redress.”).
28 Id. at 38-39; see, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, “The Way Women Are”: Some Notes in the
Margin for Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 619, 619 (1998) (describing Justice
Ginsburg’s role as an advocate for “equal treatment” under the law).
29 Guinier, supra note 5, at 40.
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judicial rulings.30 Guinier argues that Ginsburg also modeled, for working
women, how to participate in the public sphere and “helped authorize women
to push back on the dominant norms of the Court’s conservative majority and
to elaborate their own stories.”31
Guinier’s attending to the ways in which their biographies may have led
Supreme Court Justices to reach out to litigants and to ordinary citizens brings
to mind work done some years ago concerning the relationship between
legality and empathy, or how a judge’s capacity for empathy may shape his or
her ruling.32 In her article, Legality and Empathy, Lynne Henderson began by
quoting Justice Thurgood Marshall: “It is perfectly proper for judges to
disagree about what the Constitution requires. But it is disgraceful for an
interpretation of the Constitution to be premised upon unfounded assumptions
about how people live.”33
Henderson’s project challenges the assumption that “legality,” or “the
dominant belief system about the Rule and role of Law,” and “empathy,” are
“mutually exclusive concepts,” such that emotion and feeling should be kept
separate from the work of judges.34 Empathy, she writes, entails: “(1) feeling
the emotion of another; (2) understanding the experience or situation of
another, . . . often achieved by imagining oneself to be in the position of the
other; and (3) action brought about by experiencing the distress of another”;
the first two elements are “ways of knowing,” while the third is a “catalyst for
action.”35 Henderson argues that empathy is a valuable “way of knowing” that
can aid judges in appreciating “the human meanings of a given legal situation,”
and in the processes of reaching decisions and justifying conclusions.36

30 Id. at 41 (citing Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in
Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985)).
31 Id. Guinier also notes that Justice Ginsburg issued an impassioned written and oral
dissent in Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1640 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Here, too, Ginsburg’s pioneering role in litigating sex-equality cases that challenged
“archaic” stereotypes about women’s capacities likely informed her critique of the
majority’s denial of women’s decisional autonomy for a “way of thinking” that “reflects
ancient notions about women’s place in the family and under the Constitution – ideas that
have long since been discredited.” Id. at 1649. Thus, Guinier observes: “In Carhart, Justice
Ginsburg showed she well understands how expressive harms that demean women based on
nineteenth-century stereotypes discourage their active participation in democracy.” Guinier,
supra note 5, at 50.
32 Henderson, supra note 17, at 1576 (observing the tendency “to deny a role to
empathetic responses in . . . approaches to legal problems” and arguing that allowing such a
role will lead to improved decision-making).
33 Id. at 1574.
34 Id. at 1576.
35 Id. at 1579.
36 Id. at 1576.
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To illustrate, she contends that certain Justices’ empathy for the narratives
presented to them best explains the decisions in Brown v. Board of Education37
and Shapiro v. Thompson.38 By contrast, Roe v. Wade39 and its progeny reflect
a selective empathy, a “failure to hear certain empathic narratives,” while
Bowers v. Hardwick40 reflects a “complete failure of empathy.”41 There have
been dramatic changes to the constitutional law landscape in these areas since
Henderson wrote. Notably, in contrast to Hardwick’s lack of empathy for
homosexuals, Lawrence v. Texas, in overruling Hardwick, spoke of the
“dignity” to which homosexuals were entitled and spoke respectfully of their
intimate association.42 Nonetheless, Henderson’s plea to look at emotion as a
component of judging is still timely, as the recent outpouring of scholarship
about law and emotion suggests.43 Moreover, legal scholars continue to study
the role of narrative and storytelling in key Supreme Court cases and how
stories can change the law as well as a society’s self-understanding.44
It is helpful to situate Guinier’s project of demosprudence through dissent in
the context of Henderson’s plea and these ongoing strands of legal inquiry.
But doing so also suggests the new ground opened up by Guinier’s project.
For example, Henderson illuminates how either the presence or absence of
empathy shaped various Supreme Court opinions.45 By contrast, Guinier looks
to biography as a partial explanation for why a particular Justice would choose
the form of an oral dissent and speak directly to “ordinary citizens.”46 Seeking
to explain the role of empathy in Brown, Henderson points to the Court’s
37

347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969) (invalidating state laws which required denying welfare
benefits to new residents for a full year); see Henderson, supra note 17, at 1577 (discussing
the impact of empathy in Brown and Shapiro).
39 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
40 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
41 Henderson, supra note 17, at 1577.
42 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. Further, Henderson concludes her article with a
reference to empathy, reminding us of our “common humanity and responsibility to one
another.” Henderson, supra note 17, at 1653. Indeed, in Goodridge v. Department of
Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
appealed to the “common humanity” of same-sex and opposite-sex couples. Id. at 955.
Common humanity or shared human aspirations to marriage are themes in that opinion and
other state high court opinions receptive to constitutional challenges by same-sex couples to
state marriage laws, as is the notion that gay men and lesbians are neighbors, not strangers.
See, e.g., Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 218 (N.J. 2006) (explaining that same-sex couples
“are our neighbors, our co-workers, and our friends”).
43 For a helpful introduction to the literature, see generally THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan
A. Bandes ed., 1999).
44 See ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 110-64 (2000).
45 Henderson, supra note 17, at 1577, 1649-50 (discussing empathy’s role in Supreme
Court cases dealing with segregation, poverty, abortion, and homosexuality).
46 Guinier, supra note 5, at 59.
38
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recognition of human emotion in Brown’s famous language regarding how
racial school segregation creates in black children a “feeling of inferiority as to
their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone.”47 How did the Court come to that understanding?
In part, through then-attorney Thurgood Marshall’s arguments and the expert
testimony presented by Dr. Kenneth Clark;48 but the Court’s receptivity to
these arguments may have had roots in the experiences of particular members
of the Court. Thus, Henderson recounts how Justice Frankfurter struggled to
reconcile his commitment to legality – his view of the proper constitutional
result – with his conviction that segregation was repugnant.49 Henderson
recounts Frankfurter’s experience as a Jew who had only partially succeeded at
assimilating and posits that as “a member of a group subjected to the worst
forms of racism, prejudice, and torture throughout history . . . [t]he pain of the
experience of being Jewish could not help but resonate even if only slightly to
the pain of another oppressed minority.”50 Frankfurter had also been advisory
counsel to the NAACP.51 Biographer H.N. Hirsch further suggests that
Frankfurter’s willingness to go along with the Court’s decision may have
stemmed from “the personal value [he] attached to the importance of public
schools as a means of integration into American society.”52
A common aspect of both Henderson’s and Guinier’s projects is the
emphasis on taking action.53 The third element of empathy, noted above, is
“action brought about by experiencing the distress of another.”54 Empathy is a

47

Henderson, supra note 17, at 1594 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494
(1954)).
48 See id. at 1596-1603 (discussing Thurgood Marshall’s arguments in Brown and the
role played by Dr. Kenneth Clark’s expert testimony on the social science research).
Henderson notes that some members of the Court were not persuaded by this resort to social
science. Id. at 1603-04 (examining the responses of Justices Jackson and Frankfurter to the
sociological narrative used by the NAACP). It lies beyond the scope of this Essay to
discuss the subsequent debates about this strategy and controversy over Dr. Clark’s
testimony. But for a sampling of that debate, see, for example, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 264-65 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (deriding the majority’s heavy reliance on
one-sided social science evidence when other social science evidence shows different
conclusions); Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 153-54 (1955)
(considering the dilemma of using “the Brandeis brief, filled with sociological and
economic data for the judges’ information” to overturn legislation).
49 See Henderson, supra note 17, at 1604-05.
50 Id. at 1604.
51 See id.
52 H.N. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 195 n.* (1981).
53 See Guinier, supra note 5, at 50 (“[D]emosprudential dissents summon the public –
through their representatives or their own marching feet – to act in the name of
democracy.”); Henderson, supra note 17, at 1579.
54 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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way of knowing that is a “catalyst for action.”55 The relevant action, in
Henderson’s analysis, is reaching a legal conclusion that will address the harm
that another is suffering, whether ordering the desegregation of schools or, as
in Shapiro v. Thompson, affording poor people their constitutional right to
travel to another state to be with family or to improve their lot.56 The third
element of Guinier’s definition of a demosprudential dissent is “facilitative,”
or, in effect, catalytic.57 Guinier explains: “[T]he dissenting opinion speaks to
non-judicial actors, whether legislators, local thought leaders, or ordinary
people, and encourages them to step in or step up to revisit the majority’s
conclusions.”58 While Henderson introduces greater attention to empathy to
encourage better judging and opinions informed by appreciation for “our
common humanity,”59 Guinier urges dissenting Justices to view their dissents
as an opportunity to expand the arena of democratic action and
accountability.60 Guinier, in her concluding pages, turns to majority opinions
as a form of demosprudence.61 Although legal academics criticized Brown for
its lack of “well-developed legal reasoning,” they fail to see its
“demosprudential quality”; its very “accessibility and forcefulness were the
inspiration for a social movement that gave the opinion its legs.”62
In this brief Essay, I cannot offer a thorough discussion of the costs and
benefits of Guinier’s demosprudential dissent strategy. This may be due in
part to the temptation to bring a results-oriented approach to assessing such
dissents. Thus, because I disagree with the Ledbetter ruling, I like that Justice
Ginsburg’s oral dissent spurred Lily Ledbetter and Congress to take up the
cause of “fixing” the Court’s ruling through legislative change.63 Indeed,
Congress has already taken action, endorsed first by President Obama as a
55

See Henderson, supra note 17, at 1579.
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969) (“An indigent who desires to migrate,
resettle, find a new job, and start a new life will doubtless hesitate if he knows that he must
risk making the move without the possibility of falling back on state welfare assistance.”);
see also Henderson, supra note 17, at 1615-17 (describing the majority opinion in Shapiro
as focused on the individual indigents whose constitutional right to travel had been impeded
by the states’ one-year residency requirement for welfare benefits).
57 Guinier, supra note 5, at 48. The other two elements are (1) “on a substantive level,
the dissent probes or tests a particular understanding of democracy,” and (2) “its style likely
deviates from the conventional point-by-point refutation of the majority’s logical flaws,”
and instead “may tell a good ‘public story,’ built upon shared experiences and common
concerns” or use other dramatic methods. Id. at 47-48.
58 Id. at 48.
59 Henderson, supra note 17, at 1653.
60 Guinier, supra note 5, at 131 (urging that “[t]he time is ripe . . . for the Court to see
beyond academics to the people themselves as a source of democratic authority and
accountability”).
61 See id. at 130-31.
62 Id. at 131.
63 Id. at 41.
56
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Senator and candidate, and subsequently, as President, when he signed the
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act.64 By contrast, because I agree with the result
reached by the majority in Lawrence and also support opening up civil
marriage to same-sex couples, I dislike Justice Scalia’s warning to “ordinary
people” – “[d]o not believe it” (that is, the majority’s disclaimer that the case
does not involve formally recognizing homosexual relationships) – when he
contends that soon the nation will have same-sex marriage foisted upon it by
the federal judiciary and that the majority signals the death knell of all
“morals” legislation.65 I dislike it both as a misreading of Lawrence, but also
because there is reason to believe that his dissent did catalyze opponents of
same-sex marriage to renew efforts to pass state “defense of marriage” laws
and amend state constitutions to forbid same-sex couples from marrying, as
well as to amend the U.S. Constitution to bar such marriages.66
Putting this results-oriented reaction aside, I am drawn to Guinier’s
emphasis on the educative role of Supreme Court opinions generally, of
dissents in particular, and of her call for an expanded sphere of democratic
action.67 Finally, her examination of how biography may shape judicial
decision-making68 is a timely one as a new President faces the prospect of
making a number of judicial nominations. To return to Henderson, how
biography shapes the capacity for empathy may well prove an important theme
in that process.69
II.

PRESIDENT OBAMA, EMPATHY, AND JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS

Shortly before the 2008 presidential election, Professor Steven Calabresi, in
an editorial in the Wall Street Journal, drew attention to then-candidate Barack
Obama’s statement about how he would select judges:
[W]e need somebody who’s got the heart, the empathy, to recognize what
it’s like to be a young teenage mom. The empathy to understand what it’s

64

Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (to be codified at
42 U.S.C. §2000a). For President Obama’s remarks on signing this bill, see Remarks on
Signing the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. No. 33 (Jan. 29,
2009) [hereinafter Remarks on Signing the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act].
65 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 599-605 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
66 See Guinier, supra note 5, at 98 (describing the response to Justice Scalia’s dissent in
Lawrence). Having criticized Scalia’s dissent in part for its catalytic effect, I should
acknowledge that the majority opinion itself offended some proponents of traditional
marriage and of a proper state role in using the criminal law to instill moral values; they
probably did not need Justice Scalia’s opinion to motivate them. It is also likely that even
without Justice Ginsburg’s exhortation, those committed to pay equity for women would
likely have acted to rectify the Court’s ruling.
67 Id. at 134 (“In this tradition, Justices teach the public to identify with the constitutional
values at stake and invite them to speak back in a voice that is all their own.”).
68 See id. at 32-45.
69 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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like to be poor, or African-American, or gay, or disabled, or old. And
that’s the criteria by which I’m going to be selecting my judges.70
Calabresi warned that this means “[e]mpathy, not justice, ought to be the
mission of the federal courts, and the redistribution of wealth should be their
mantra” – a dangerous departure from the traditional image of justice, or
Justitia, as blind-folded.71 This recent editorial suggests the continuing
relevance of a perceived dichotomy between legality and empathy.72 Calabresi
expresses the contrast as between justice and empathy: “To the traditional view
of justice as a blindfolded person weighing legal claims fairly on a scale,
[Obama] wants to tear the blindfold off, so the judge can rule for the party he
empathizes with most.”73 Calabresi warns that “[n]othing less than the very
idea of liberty and the rule of law are at stake in this election,” concluding that
“[w]e should not let Mr. Obama replace justice with empathy in our nation’s
courtrooms.”74
Now that Senator Obama is President Obama, we will have the opportunity
to learn more about his understanding of empathy and, presumably, his critics’
fears of the antithesis between justice and empathy. Why does President
Obama believe empathy is important to judging and how does he think it
should shape judicial reasoning? Some answers appear in his remarks about
why he voted against confirming John Roberts as Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court.75 Then-Senator Obama explained that he was “sorely tempted to vote
for Judge Roberts” based on, among other things, his conversations with thenJudge Roberts, Roberts’s resume, comportment, temperament, humility,
personal decency, and love for the law.76 Moreover, he believed that Judge
Roberts had deep respect for the “basic precepts that go into deciding 95
percent of the cases that come before the Federal court – adherence to
precedence [sic], a certain modesty in reading statutes and constitutional text, a
respect for procedural regularity, and an impartiality in presiding over the

70

Calabresi, supra note 18 (emphasis added) (quoting Senator Barack Obama, Speech to
the Planned Parenthood Action Fund (July 17, 2007), available at
http://lauraetch.googlepages.com/barackobamabeforeplannedparenthoodaction.
71 Id. Although I am not taking up here Calabresi’s attack on redistribution, Sotirios A.
Barber (a contributor to this symposium), in a letter to the Wall Street Journal, pointed out
the problems with Calabresi’s dichotomy: courts have a role in ensuring that government
fulfill its object of securing the “general Welfare, and . . . the Blessings of Liberty.” Sotirios
A. Barber, Letter to the Editor, Any Big Change to the Courts Will Take a Long Time, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 7, 2008, at A16 (quoting U.S. CONST. pmbl.).
72 See Calabresi, supra note 18.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 See 151 CONG. REC. S10,365-66 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2005).
76 Id. at S10,366 (statement of Sen. Obama).
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adversarial system.”77 The problem, Obama explained, was the other five
percent of cases:
The problem I face . . . is that while adherence to legal precedent and
rules of statutory or constitutional construction will dispose of 95 percent
of the cases that come before a court, so that both a Scalia and a Ginsburg
will arrive at the same place most of the time on those 95 percent of the
cases – what matters on the Supreme Court is those 5 percent of cases that
are truly difficult. In those cases, adherence to precedent and rules of
construction and interpretation will only get you through the 25th mile of
the marathon. That last mile can only be determined on the basis of one’s
deepest values, one’s core concerns, one’s broader perspectives on how
the world works, and the depth and breadth of one’s empathy.78
Thus, Obama explicitly identifies empathy as an important personal quality
that is not antagonistic to justice, but is an important supplement when “rule of
law” values alone do not supply an answer.79 In “hard cases,” he continues,
where constitutional text is not “directly on point,” and statutory language not
perfectly clear, “the critical ingredient is supplied by what is in the judge’s
heart.”80 Specific case examples Obama provides are whether a right of
privacy encompasses a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy or whether a
person with disabilities has a right to accommodation so that “they can work
alongside those who are nondisabled.”81 He notes that in their conversations,
Judge Roberts said it was “not easy for him to talk about his values and his
deeper feelings,” but that “he doesn’t like bullies and has always viewed the
law as a way of evening out the playing field between the strong and the
weak.”82 Senator Obama, while “impressed with that statement” because it
mirrored his own view of law, found Judge Roberts’s record to the contrary:
“[I]t is my personal estimation that he has far more often used his formidable
skills on behalf of the strong in opposition to the weak,” for example, siding
with “those who were dismissive of efforts to eradicate the remnants of racial
discrimination in our political process” and of those who dismiss “the concerns
that it is harder to make it in this world and in this economy when you are a
woman rather than a man.”83 Obama concluded that because he had to “give
more weight to his deeds” than his words, he must vote against Judge Roberts,
although he hoped that Judge Roberts would prove to have a
“jurisprudence . . . that stands up to the bullies of all ideological stripes.”84

77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84

Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

600

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:589

Obama’s remarks opposing the confirmation of Samuel Alito to the
Supreme Court and Janice Rogers Brown to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
reiterate his concerns about appointing a judge who consistently sides with the
powerful over the powerless.85 Does this concern evidence a disregard for
justice or the rule of law? To the contrary, Obama appeals to the idea – voiced
by Roberts – that the law should afford a chance to even an unequal playing
field.86 To return to the speech Calabresi criticized, Obama related the need
for “heart” or “empathy” to the need for judges to be able to understand the
experience of being part of a marginalized or disadvantaged group.87 Calabresi
correctly observes that Obama’s vision is not a model of judicial blindness.88
However, removing the blindfold does not suggest an abandonment of the rule
of law or justice. As a burgeoning literature on the image of Justitia suggests,
the very isolation of Justitia from the litigants before her may contribute to a
failure to secure justice.89 Thus, feminist, Critical Race, and other legal
scholars invite reflection on whether removing the blindfold might be an
appropriate updating of Justitia which would allow for a useful transcending of
overly sharp dichotomies between justice and care, legality and empathy, or
even judgment and mercy.90 President Obama’s election squarely puts the
issue of the qualities sought in adjudication and the role of judges on the table
in perhaps new and fruitful ways. We may also see more embodiment of
85 See 152 CONG. REC. S190 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 2006) (statement of Sen. Obama)
(“[W]hen I examine the philosophy, ideology, and record of Samuel Alito, I’m deeply
troubled.”). In opposing Janice Rogers Brown’s nomination to the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals, Obama referred to her as a “political activist who happens to be a judge,” who
used her position on the bench to further “social Darwinism, a view of America that says
there is not a problem that cannot be solved by making sure that the rich get richer and the
poor get poorer.” 151 CONG. REC. S6178 (daily ed. June 8, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Obama).
86 See 151 CONG. REC. S10,366 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2005) (statement of Sen. Obama).
87 See Calabresi, supra note 18.
88 See id.
89 See, e.g., ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 27-60 (1997) (discussing the limitations of
viewing justice as blindfolded in order to be impartial and universal).
90 For feminist critiques, see id. at 50, 51-52 (arguing for the integration of care and
justice and a relational ethic on which judges should recognize the “particular claims of the
particular litigants on the court’s legal and moral imagination and resources”); Judith Resnik
& Dennis E. Curtis, Representing Justice: From Renaissance Iconography to Twenty-FirstCentury Courthouses, 151 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 139, 160-64 (2007) (discussing the
meaning of the blindfold on the image of Justice from a historical perspective); see also
Judith Resnik, Reconstructing Equality: Of Justice, Justicia, and the Gender of Jurisdiction,
14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 393, 396, 419 (2002) (discussing the “irony of the longstanding
association of the female body with Justice,” given historic forms of sex inequality and
contemporary failures to prevent violence against women). For a Critical Race Theory
perspective, see Bennett Capers, On Justitia, Race, Gender, and Blindness, 12 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 203, 206-07 (2006) (questioning the blindness of Justice when race plays such an
important role in society).
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Justice Thurgood Marshall’s ideal of judges understanding “how people
live.”91
III. THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN SPURRING SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION
My third comment on Professor Guinier’s article concerns the relationship
between her project and the broader issue of “the constitution outside the
courts,” that is, the idea that courts alone cannot – and should not – bring about
the full realization of constitutional ideals.92 The literature on this topic is too
vast to engage in any detail in this brief Essay, but I will focus on one recent
contribution by political scientist Rogers Smith.93 Guinier contemplates
demosprudential dissents as appropriate catalysts when the dissenter believes
the majority is wrong and seeks to educate and mobilize the public either to
have a critical discourse about the law or to make efforts to bring about law
reform.94 In contrast, Smith posits that courts necessarily have a relatively
limited role to play in bringing about the fundamental structural institutional
change that is needed to bring about full, equal citizenship – substantive
equality – for minorities and for women.95 He refers to the marginality of the
Supreme Court because “the most important tasks in restructuring American
institutions to remove barriers to meaningfully equal citizenship for women
and men now go far beyond the capacities and the legitimate authority of the
judiciary when engaged in constitutional interpretation.”96 For example, laws
explicitly disadvantaging women are rare and “women have far greater formal
opportunities than in the past”; however, “overall public policies and social
practices still structure the lives of most women so that they carry
disproportionate responsibilities for family and household care and face greater
difficulties acquiring economic resources.”97 Compounding this with other
factors like sexual harassment in the workplace, welfare policies affecting lowincome women, and continuing bias in criminal justice systems, leads to the
result that “overall, women do not really have meaningfully equal chances to
gain and exercise political influence, or to have ‘full citizenship stature . . .
[defined by Justice Ginsburg as] equal opportunity to aspire, achieve,
participate in and contribute to society based on their individual talents and
capacities.’”98
91

United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 460 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 181-82
(1999) (defining “populist constitutional law” as “treat[ing] constitutional law not as
something in the hands of lawyers and judges but in the hands of the people themselves”).
93 Smith, supra note 19.
94 See Guinier, supra note 5.
95 See Smith, supra note 19 (manuscript at 4).
96 Id. (manuscript at 18).
97 Id.
98 Id. (manuscript at 19) (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996)).
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What can courts, and the Supreme Court in particular, do to bring about the
structural transformation needed to secure equal citizenship? While Smith
cautions against looking to the Court for such structural change, he argues that
it can – and should – play a helpful, perhaps catalytic role by pointing out the
need for such transformation:
The courts do have a constitutional duty to pursue gender equality and
civic equality to the very margins of their institutional competence. Even
when it would be wrong for them to devise and mandate sweeping
remedies, they should scrutinize more closely public policies and
institutional arrangements that foster conditions in which women do not
on balance have equal practical opportunities to be politically active
citizens. Their rulings can then help highlight the most important tasks of
civic restructuring that confront the rest of us.99
For example, Smith applauds the Court’s decision in Nevada Department of
Human Resources v. Hibbs100 for upholding a private right of action under the
Family and Medical Leave Act.101 At the same time, he faults Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s majority opinion for not linking work/family conflict – and the
continuing problem of how mutually reinforcing stereotypes about women and
men hinder their ability to be parents and workers – to women’s equal
citizenship.102
CONCLUSION: PURSUING JUSTICE IN EVERYDAY LIFE
Professor Guinier’s invitation to consider the potential of Supreme Court
dissents to spur “ordinary people” to action encourages her readers in the legal
academy to reflect on the role of courts in catalyzing citizens to engage in
social and constitutional change. Her specific examples of Lilly Ledbetter and
Pat Todd suggest that sometimes an impassioned oral dissent can strike a
resonant chord with a listener who, like the dissenter, believes the Court has
failed to do justice and uphold constitutional values in the case before it. It
seems a propitious time, with the election of President Obama, to consider the
potential for such oral dissents. As noted above, President Obama identifies
empathy and the ability to appreciate the stories of the lives of the
marginalized and the powerless as an important judicial quality.
But beyond the executive’s role in the judicial appointment process, the
executive may also play a role in inspiring activism. After all, the Obama
campaign and the Democratic Convention made much of Lilly Ledbetter’s
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Id. (manuscript at 4-5).
538 U.S. 721 (2003).
101 Id. at 724-25; see Smith, supra note 19 (manuscript at 3).
102 Smith, supra note 19 (manuscript at 4) (“[T]he problem[] presented [in Hibbs] [was a]
crucial one[] for the well-being of women. But none of the Justices who wrote opinions
gave any substantial, explicit attention to issues of gender and equal constitutional
citizenship.”).
100
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fight for justice.103 Obama often links such struggles to a quest to honor core
American principles. Thus, upon signing the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay
Restoration Act, President Obama described her as deciding “that there was a
principle at stake, something worth fighting for,” noting that her long journey
culminated in a law “which will help others get the justice that she was
denied.”104 First Lady Michelle Obama described “Lilly’s story and the
broader issue of equal pay” as a concern “voiced over and over and over”
during the campaign; at the signing, she praised Ledbetter as an “extraordinary
woman” who “knew unfairness when she saw it, and was willing to do
something about it because it was the right thing to do.”105 At the signing of
the Act, Ledbetter herself said that even though she would “never see a cent
from my case,” her “richer reward” is that “my daughters and granddaughters,
and your daughters and granddaughters, will have a better deal.”106 In lofty
rhetoric, President Obama’s signing statement linked the specific legislation to
a vindication of fundamental national principles: “It is fitting that the very first
bill that I sign . . . is upholding one of this nation’s founding principles: that we
are all created equal and each deserve a chance to pursue our own version of
happiness.”107 Moreover, his populist rhetoric links justice to everyday life:
“Justice isn’t about some abstract legal theory, or footnote in a casebook. It’s
about how our laws affect the daily lives and the daily realities of people: their
ability to make a living and care for their families and achieve their goals.”108
The political theater of President Obama signing the bill while surrounded
by Ledbetter, First Lady Michelle Obama, and female lawmakers all adorned
in a bold blaze of red (the color of pay equity) was inspired and inspiring.109
Moreover, his praise of Ledbetter and of other “advocates” who worked hard
to “stand[] for what’s right” may itself inspire further social activism, as
ordinary people see what can result from such efforts.110 Thus, even as
Professor Guinier invites the Court to open up new possibilities of democratic
103 Ledbetter spoke at the Democratic Convention, see Lilly Ledbetter, Address to the
Democratic National Convention (Aug. 26, 2008), http://www.demconvention.com/lilyledbetter/, and Obama pledged during his campaign to sign a law to overturn the Court’s
decision. See CHANGE WE CAN BELIEVE IN: BARACK OBAMA’S PLAN TO RENEW AMERICA’S
PROMISE 165 (2008) (“As President, Barack Obama will . . . [s]ign into law the Fair Pay
Restoration Act that Barack Obama co-introduced to overturn last year’s Supreme Court
decision that made it harder for women to file pay-discrimination claims after they become
victims of discriminatory compensation.”); Robert Pear, Justices’ Ruling in Discrimination
Case May Draw Quick Action by Obama, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2009, at A13.
104 Remarks on Signing the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, supra note 64, at 1.
105 The White House Blog, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog_post/AWonderfulDay/ (Jan.
29, 2009, 12:00 EST).
106 Id.
107 Remarks on Signing the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, supra note 64, at 1.
108 Id.
109 See The White House Blog, supra note 105.
110 Remarks on Signing the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, supra note 64, at 2.
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engagement through demosprudential dissent, it is worth directing attention to
the potential of the executive, in this “new era of responsibility,”111 to serve as
an even more powerful catalyst to democratic engagement and vindication of
core constitutional principles and national values.
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Inaugural Address, DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. No 1, at 4 (Jan. 20, 2009).

